

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 SAI-01 ACDA-19 OIC-04 DRC-01 CU-05

/146 W

----- 117505

R 120830Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2868

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS UNN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4034

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, PARM, SW, NL, SZ, UR

SUBJECT: SWEDEN AND CSCE

REF: STOCKHOLM 3836

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1. SUMMARY: I CALLED ON MFA SECRETARY GENERAL ASTROM AT HIS REQUEST SEPTEMBER 11. MAIN TOPIC OF OUR DISCUSSION WAS CSCE, AND ASTROM ADVANCED SWEDISH VIEW THAT CONFERENCE SHOULD BE TERMINATED BY SUMMIT MEETING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. ASTROM ALSO EXPRESSED SWEDISH CONCERN OVER "MAXIMALIST" POSITION OF DUTCH AND SWISS GOVERNMENTS ON BASKET III, WHICH HE SAID SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACCEPT. WHILE EXPRESSING FLEXIBLE SWEDISH ATTITUDE ON LEVEL OF CSCE SUMMIT AND ON CSCE FOLLOW-UP, ASTROM SAID GOS INTENDED TO PRESS FOR MORE MEANINGFUL CBMS PARTICULARLY ON QUESTION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. I CALLED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SVERKER ASTROM, TODAY (SEPT. 11) AT HIS REQUEST. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, ASTROM SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY EAGER TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE CSCE AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME.

3. ASTROM SAID THAT THE GOS HAD JUST COMPLETED AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF THE CSCE, AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT CONFERENCE SHOULD BE TERMINATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY A SUMMIT MEETING, EITHER IN DECEMBER OR EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE REASONING BEHIND THIS CONCLUSION, ASTROM CONTINUED, IS THAT THE GOS BELIEVES THAT THE POSTWAR CHAPTER OF EUROPEAN HISTORY SHOULD NOW BE CLOSED AND A NEW ONE OPENED WHICH WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY A NEW SPIRIT OF COOPERATION, AND, BY SUBSIDENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL ANTAGONISMS, IF NOT BY "CONVERGENCE," THEN AT LEAST BY CONSENSUS ON THE AVOIDANCE OF MILITARY CONFLICT. THE SPECIFIC SWEDISH GOALS AT CSCE, ASTROM SAID, ARE THE LIMITED ONES OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON THE REUNION OF FAMILIES AND IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS WORKING IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT ARE BEING SENT TO THE SWEDISH DELEGATION IN GENEVA.

4. CONTINUING, ASTROM SAID THE GOS DOES NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CAN BE PERSUADED TO AGREE ON MEASURES THEY REGARD AS INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND EVEN WERE THEY TO AGREE TO SUCH MEASURES, THEY WOULD NOT ADHERE TO THEM. UNFORTUNATELY, ASTROM ASSERTED, THE CONFIDENTIAL

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND SWITZERLAND HAVE TAKEN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "MAXIMALIST" POSITIONS AT CSCE, PARTICULARLY ON BASKET III. FURTHERMORE, WHILE THE LEADERSHIP OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES MAY NOW BE WILLING TO BACK OFF FROM THIS LINE, PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR COUNTRIES NOW APPARENTLY SUPPORTS THE "MAXIMALIST" POSITION, THUS MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO SCALE DOWN THEIR DEMANDS.

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AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4034

5. NOTING THAT PRIME MINISTER PALME WAS DEPARTING TODAY FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO HOLLAND, AND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSSON IS GOING TO SWITZERLAND, I ASKED IF THE PURPOSE OF THESE VISITS WAS TO DISCUSS CSCE. ASTROM REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CSCE
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WOULD CERTAINLY BE RAISED IN BOTH CAPITALS.

6. THE GOS POSITION ON A FOLLOW-UP TO THE CSCE IS EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE, ASTROM SAID, BUT THE GOS REGARDS SOME KIND OF FOLLOW-UP AS ESSENTIAL, SUCH AS PERIODIC MEETINGS WHICH COULD SERVE AS A KIND OF AUDIT TO SEE HOW THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE CSCE WERE WORKING OUT. HE NOTED THAT THE GOS IS KEEPING IN RESERVE A PROPOSAL FOR THE CALLING OF A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING OF 1-2 DAYS DURATION. SUCH A MEETING, HE STATED, IF WELL PREPARED, COULD RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE MINUTE DIFFERENCES IN WORDING IN WHICH THE CONFERENCE HAS RECENTLY LOST ITSELF.

7. WITH REGARD TO A SUMMIT MEETING, ASTROM POINTED OUT THAT THE NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING LATE LAST MONTH HAD ADOPTED LANGUAGE QUITE SIMILAR TO THAT USED IN THE NIXON-BREZHNEV COMMUNIQUE FOR A SUMMIT MEETING TO CONCLUDE CSCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. HOWEVER, ASTROM SAID THAT ON THIS POINT, TOO, THE GOS POSITION WAS FLEXIBLE, THE ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATION FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE BEING THAT A SUMMIT MEETING, REGARDLESS OF LEVEL, BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

8. ONE AREA OF DIFFERENCE WITH THE USG AT THE CSCE, ASTROM CONTINUED, IS OUR DIFFERING VIEWS ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. THE GOS POSITION ON CBMS HE DESCRIBED AS "MAXIMALIST," AND SINCE THE GOS REGARDS OUR PROPOSALS AS INADEQUATE, IT WILL PRESS FOR MORE MEANINGFUL CBMS. I ASKED ASTROM WHAT SPECIFICALLY HE HAD IN MIND, AND HE SAID THE GOS BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE STRONGER AND MORE PRECISE CONTROLS OF THE SIZE OF MILITARY UNITS INVOLVED IN MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS, THE DISTANCE OF SUCH DEPLOYMENTS FROM BORDERS, AND THE TIMING OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION.

9. NOTING THAT SOVIET VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV HAD BEEN IN STOCKHOLM MEETING WITH MFA OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS UN AFFAIRS, I ASKED IF THE GOS HAD DISCUSSED CSCE WITH ZEMSKOV. WHEN ASTROM REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, I INQUIRED WHETHER THE VICE MINISTER HAD RAISED MBFR. ASTROM ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, ADDING THAT ZEMSKOV HAD NOT SUGGESTED ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN CSCE AND MBFR.

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ASTROM ADDED HIS OWN VIEW THAT, INDEED, THERE IS NO LINKAGE, SINCE CSCE IS A SHORT-TERM AFFAIR SOON TO BE

TERMINATED, WHILE MBFR WILL PROBABLY LAST FOR YEARS.

10. COMMENT: FROM MY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING MY TALK RECENTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER PALME (REFTEL), I BELIEVE THAT A MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE NETHERLANDS AND OF FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSSON TO SWITZERLAND IS TO PERSUADE THE DUTCH AND SWISS TO BACK OFF FROM THEIR "MAXIMALIST" POSITIONS AT CSCE SO THAT THE CONFERENCE CAN BE WOUND UP PROMPTLY. THE SWEDES SEEM TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE IN AREAS THEY REGARD AS VITAL TO THEIR INTERESTS AND THAT THEREFORE THE CONFERENCE SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO ITS CONCLUSION IN ORDER TO, AS ASTROM PUT IT, CLOSE ON CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE AND OPEN A NEW ONE.
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